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Abstract 
The effectiveness of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on rural 
labour market dynamics in India has been widely debated in the literature. However, the 
impact of NREGS on non-agricultural labour market and children schooling outcomes in 
reference to exogenous rainfall shock is unclear from the existing literature. This paper 
exploits the Indian National Sample Survey and rainfall measures from the precipitation 
archive of the University of Delaware to investigate the role of NREGS in labour market and 
schooling outcomes of children during shocks. Using a difference-in-differences 
methodology, we focus on disaggregated shock specification and find a shock-cushioning 
pattern for NREGS during negative shocks. However, there is an excess demand for labour 
during positive shock periods resulting from exposure to NREGS. The implication is that the 
excess informal labour market opportunity translates to a reduction in school engagement for 
children in recent times. These findings summarily distinguish the role of NREGS during 
positive and negative shocks respectively.  
JEL classification: I38, J2, J46, J48 
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1. Introduction
Vulnerability of rural households in developing countries is predominantly linked to 
incomplete informal insurance mechanisms in the face of shocks. Unexpected events within 
households and communities, such as health shocks and commodity price shocks, have proven 
to be strategic destabilising factors for micro-level welfare and consumption smoothing 
dynamics in these areas. Of greater importance is the income shocks linked to post-harvest 
agricultural yields, which is determined by exogenous variation in rainfall patterns across 
geographical locations for rural communities in developing countries. 
While various intervention programs have been initiated to enhance consumption 
smoothing capacity and tackle intergenerational poverty cycle for rural households through 
conditional and unconditional cash-transfers respectively, but effectiveness of the intervention 
programs differ by implementation strategy, development level and institutional framework. 
Alternatively, in pursuit of poverty alleviation for rural households, public works programs 
have been engaged as an instrument to provide guaranteed employment and curtail 
unemployment trends in the developing countries. In this regard, substantial evidence show 
that public works programs have had both intended and unintended consequences on household 
and individual welfare outcomes. Galasso and Ravallion (2004) demonstrate that beneficiaries 
of Argentina’s Jefes de Hogar are able to avoid plunging into extreme poverty as a result of 
receiving the workfare program assistance despite the leakages in its execution.  Gilligan et al. 
(2009) reveal that Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme enhances food security and 
credit access for participant households.  
Studies on India’s historical public works programs cut across evaluation of workfare 
program at the state and country levels respectively. Gaiha (1997) and Gaiha and Imai (2002) 
investigate the effect of Maharashtra’s rural public works (Employment Guarantee Scheme – 
EGS) on poverty incidence and agricultural wages in the state. Notwithstanding that the 
simulated poverty alleviating potential of the EGS is limited in most cases in the later; there 
are indications that larger EGS and accurate targeting of poor areas have potentials for 
substantially greater welfare influence regarding poverty alleviation.   
A more recent rural employment guarantee scheme, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), was implemented in India beginning from 
February 2005. This has attracted keen interest in the literature especially as it relates to the 
welfare consequences of the workfare policy. This policy is different from previous workfare 
policies in India by virtue of its reserved quota for rural women and stepwise roll-out strategy. 
The implementation of MGNREGA has been exploited to investigate both direct and indirect 
economic outcomes which include child labour (Islam and Sivasankaran 2014), child schooling 
outcomes (Afridi et al. 2012; Li and Sekhri 2013; Shah and Steinberg 2015) consumption 
expenditures and labour market outcomes (Azam 2012; Imbert and Papp 2015; Murgai et al. 
2016) and political influence (Gupta and Mukhopadhyay 2016). While public works may have 
welfare consequences on households as showcased in the evidence above, this paper focuses 
on welfare implication of workfare programs in relation to employment dynamics resulting 
from shocks. In this framework, the ability to smooth consumption expenditure in periods of 
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negative economic shocks may help achieve a poverty alleviation goal among rural households 
in the developing countries.  
 
This paper contributes to the above-mentioned gap in knowledge to the literature on the 
impact of shocks on labour market engagements of adults and children; and the role of public 
policy programs on these outcomes. It is important to note that the child labour outcome is 
investigated in tandem with human capital predisposition of children in diverse shock periods. 
Using a disaggregated shock specification and staggered rollout of the implementation of 
MGNREGA in India, we use a difference-in-differences methodology for labour and schooling 
outcomes of rural dwellers. Our results show that while negative shock impedes labour 
engagements in periods of dry spells, NREGS helps to accommodate adults into the informal 
labour sector in a manner that sufficiently mitigates the impact of negative shocks. On the other 
hand, positive shock has no apparent impact on labour engagements. Meanwhile, NREGS 
communities, which are equally exposed to positive shock employ more female and child 
labour to ensure equilibrium within the informal labour market. We further find that schooling 
engagements of children during positive shocks reduces for early beneficiaries of the scheme.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related 
literature while section 3 highlights the basic components of MGNREGA. Section 4 discusses 
the data sources and summary statistics while section 5 presents the empirical strategy used in 
this paper. Section 6 reports our results and section 7 discusses the core areas of our findings. 
Section 8 concludes.  
2. Related Literature   
Existing literature on the effects of previous workfare programs in Indian states is vast1. 
Similarly, studies on the welfare consequences of NREGS have emerged in recent times2. The 
emergence of the recent strand of literature is motivated by the diversified welfare implication 
of public works policy commonly adopted in the developing countries. Islam and Sivasankaran 
(2014) investigate the impact of NREGS adult works opportunities on child labour and 
schooling outcomes while Afridi et al. (2012) particularly focus on household female 
participation in NREGS and relative consequences on children schooling in India.  Using 
repeated cross-section and panel data, findings from Islam and Sivasankaran (2014) unveil an 
asymmetric pattern on children’s time use by age groups. While NREGS leads to an increase 
in time spent on education for younger children, the impact for older children follows a labour 
supply shock explanation from competitive opportunities of labour demand in beneficiary 
districts.  
 
On the other way round, Afridi et al. (2012) reports asymmetric child welfare results 
by parent’s gender in NREGS. While labour force engagement of mothers in the program 
translates to better educational outcomes for their children, father’s participation has negative 
impacts on children education. This pattern connotes suggestive but strong evidence in support 
of women empowerment mechanism as an important determinant of human capital formation 
of children in developing countries. In sharp contrast, the women empowerment story 
regarding implementation of NREGS is contradicted in an empirical evidence documented by 
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Amaral et al. (2015) where domestic violence against women is positively related to NREGS 
implementation across districts. Although this contradicts women empowerment story within 
household bargaining model in Afridi et al. (2012), it seems to provide additional mechanism 
of a male backlash resulting from employment opportunities targeting females and ultimately 
reflects gender bias in India.       
 
Complementing the aforementioned child welfare evidence for NREGS as above, Shah 
and Steinberg (2015) investigate the human capital accumulation effect of the program. The 
paper exploits universal test scores of children in India as a unique human capital accumulation 
proxy; which transcends childhood consequences and indeed reflects adulthood welfare 
potentials. Their main results reveal that subsequent year of exposure to NREGS decreases 
school enrolment by 2 percentage points and math scores by 2 percent of a standard deviation 
amongst children between the ages of  13 and 16 years.  This result is premised on the 
theoretical proposition of an increased opportunity cost of schooling as a result of thriving 
informal labour opportunities, which lowers human capital investment in tandem. More 
importantly, the impact is more prevalent among adolescent boys who are primarily 
substituting into paid labour market at the expense of school while adolescent girls are 
substituting into unpaid domestic work.  While Shah and Steinberg (2015) complement Afridi 
et al. (2012) and Islam and Sivasankaran (2014), its adoption of test scores deviates from the 
tradition in related literature and carves a unique trajectory of unintended consequences of a 
workfare program on children.   
 
Consistent with the deleterious child schooling impact of NREGS above, Li and Sekhri 
(2013) examine the consequences of increasing rural employment opportunities for the human 
capital accumulation of children in rural areas. Their findings show that the introduction of 
NREGS results in lower relative enrolment rate in beneficiary districts. Further estimation 
unveils an asymmetric effect across school ownership with public school enrolment 
demonstrating the negative trend while private schools enrolment increases with the program. 
Notwithstanding increase in enrolment rate, grade repetition and pass rates worsen in private 
schools even though there is an increase in the number of teachers. It is important to reiterate 
the role of contexts in the literature documenting the impact of NREGS on children’s welfare 
in India. The contrasting empirical evidence of welfare consequences of NRGEGS on children 
may be attributed to widely varying outcome variables across studies. While Afridi et al. (2012) 
and Islam and Sivasankaran (2014) explore time use dynamics of children across beneficiary 
districts by year of exposure, the use of school enrolment rate, test scores and class repetition 
outcomes (adopted in Li and Sekhri 2013; Shah and Steinberg 2015) as dependent variables 
depict stronger human capital accumulation measures with potentially longer term 
implications.     
 
In a recent paper, Imbert and Papp (2015) exploit the staggered introduction of NREGS 
to evaluate the employment and wage rate effect of NREGS. Using DiD which exploit spatial 
distribution of the implementation of the NREGS across districts, their results reveal a 
crowding-out effect of the private sector hiring from public sector labour engagements. This 
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eventually led to an increase in equilibrium wage rate which subsequently leads to household 
welfare gains demonstrated in the use of consumption quintile regression of the poor.  
Whilst the literature has established various dimensions of the welfare impact of 
NREGS within Indian rural communities, it is unclear how plausibly rural exogenous demand 
shocks will impact access to employment opportunities for beneficiary districts. This insight 
becomes imperative following the main purpose of establishing the act, which is to cushion the 
impact of negative agricultural shocks3. The interaction between NREGS and district shock 
realization may affect flexibility of informal labour sector.  
The closest literature to this paper is Imbert and Papp (2015) which investigates 
employment and wage dynamics of NREGS for beneficiary districts. Nevertheless, we differ 
by focussing on the role of exogenous rural demand shock (caused by rainfall shocks) in 
connection with informal rural labour movements by time of exposure of districts to the works 
program.  In the same vein, while Imbert and Papp provide some insights with regard to the 
dynamics of equilibrium labour and wage rate respectively, the consequences on child labour 
and schooling are unclear and would be an additional component of labour market dynamics 
important for policy purpose. More importantly, our disaggregated shock framework and 
interaction with NREGS help to complement human capital stories in the literature (Afridi et 
al. 2012; Li and Sekhri 2013; Islam and Sivasankaran 2014; Shah and Steinberg 2015).   
3. Background  
The Indian public works program, MGNREGA, is designed to complement the government’s 
efforts at sustaining household welfare in periods of negative agricultural shock in rural areas. 
The various components of the MGNREGA are commendable, especially in relation to gender 
equity for public works compared to previous public works policies in the same country4. While 
there are potentials for women’s labour force engagements to improve thereby empowering 
them overtime, there may be spill over effects on rural labour force equilibrium in a manner 
that could trigger unexpected consequences of this policy on child labour and schooling. For 
instance, general equilibrium state of labour may be altered to favour child labour and/or reduce 
child schooling due to the associated boom in labour demand which is unaccompanied by 
corresponding expansion in rural labour force. Similarly, increase in equilibrium wage as a 
result of this imbalance as demonstrated in Imbert and Papp (2015) may encourage children to 
engage in more wage labour at the expense of attending school.   
Opting for child labour during minimum wage regimes for adult labour may drive 
informal sector activities in a bid to maintain equilibrium. Usually, children’s wages are 
unregulated and are largely determined by the employer as deemed suitable. Also, there are 
flexible rules at play for engaging child labour as employing and laying-off a child in the 
developing countries is not regulated by necessary authorities. We conjecture that this 
dynamics can lead to preference for child labour in agricultural driven economies with public 
works schemes. The implementation of public works scheme in periods of agricultural shocks 
is capable of stimulating substitution between adults and children labour engagements as 
argued above. However, agricultural boom may have more prominent effect. This is because 
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child labour may be an important source of labour force for non-agricultural informal sector 
labour demand.  
Our research complements current efforts in the literature which focuses on credit 
rationing and lack of insurance mechanisms on the impact of household shocks on child 
vulnerability in the developing countries (Guarcello et al. 2010).  While substantial literature 
have evaluated the impact of different types of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on child 
labour (Beegle et al. 2006; Congdon Fors 2012; Fabre and Pallage 2015), little is known about 
how the interaction between this and labour market policies affects school attendance and 
labour market choices of children in the developing countries. In a different perspective, while 
related literature addresses the impact of welfare packages on children labour choices with or 
without shocks (de Janvry et al. 2006; Ebeke 2012; de Hoop and Rosati 2014), examining 
public works program impacts of child engagements during shocks is yet another important 
aspect of child welfare.  
4. Data 
In this paper, we use (I) Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) employment-unemployment 
rounds from 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2009-10, (II) Rainfall data from Terrestrial Precipitation: 
1900-2010 Gridded Monthly Time Series (version 3.01), Center for Climatic Research, 
University of Delaware. The 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2009-10 employment-unemployment 
rounds of the Indian NSS correspond to 61st, 64th and 66th rounds of national representative 
labour participation data for Indian households. While these are labour surveys, it is imperative 
to note that the questionnaire also collects data on schooling participation of children. These 
are nationally representative household surveys conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and 
Program Implementation (MoSPI) in India. These surveys provide information on labour 
engagements and wages for each household member in the seven days preceding the interview 
period.  
 
We use rainfall data from Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2010 Gridded Monthly Time 
Series (version 3.01) collected by Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware. The 
rainfall data is available for 0.5 by 0.5 degree latitude-longitude grids and this is matched to 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) of each district. The rainfall measure used in this paper 
is the rainfall in the previous agricultural year. For example, to correspond to the employment-
unemployment data from July 2004 to June 2005, we use rainfall measures from January 2004-
December 2004. This lag nature gives time to respond to demand shocks arising from the 
effects of rainfall on the local economy in the informal sector (agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors). The monsoon rainfall during June to December is used for planting during India 
agricultural seasons. During this period, public workfare projects are not active within the rural 
areas. However, after the monsoon, the quantum of public works projects implemented  at the 
local level reflect informal labour demand as a response to agricultural sector capacity to 
provide sufficient employment for the informal sector labour.   
 
We use quantified rainfall shock which we disaggregated into dry shock and wet shock 
regimes to further showcase the relevance of the major components of weather shocks on the 
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Indian rural labour dynamics. Quantified rainfall shock obtained this way is calculated as a 
deviation of the yearly rainfall measure from the long-term average in a district. We use a 61-
year district level rainfall average from 1950-2010 to capture a long-term rainfall variation 
recommended in the literature5. We focus on quantified rainfall shock measure similar to 
Maccini and Yang (2009), Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) and Rocha and Soares (2015) for our 
analyses6. The quantified rainfall shocks used in this paper are specified as follows:   
 
Rainfall Shock Components7  
 
Wet shockdt−1      = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{0 , 𝑙𝑛 Rainfalldt−1 − 𝑙𝑛 Rainfalld̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }               (2)  
 
 Dry shockdt−1      = abs {𝑚𝑖𝑛(0 , 𝑙𝑛 Rainfalldt−1  − 𝑙𝑛 Rainfalld ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )}                (3)
                
Where 𝑙𝑛 is the natural logarithm; and Rainfalldt−1and Rainfalld̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   each represent district level 
rainfall measures for the previous agricultural season and 61-years average respectively. As 
previously mentioned, the construction of Rainshockdt in equation (1) (See endnote vi) follows 
rainfall shock measures used for similar studies in the development literature (Maccini and 
Yang 2009; Björkman-Nyqvist 2013; Rocha and Soares 2015). These quantified rainfall shocks 
are suitable to measure the impact of the deviation of district level rainfall pattern on harvests 
and agricultural performance for rural households. Our disaggregated shock components in 
equations (2) and (3) respectively are constructed to measure positive and negative (absolute) 
deviations from historical rainfall norm. We expect Wet shock and Dry shock to affect rainfed 
agricultural yields from crop production differently8. This may play important role in designing 
response programs to flood or drought events in rural areas.  
4.1 Definition of Outcomes 
 
We construct the outcome variables as follows. The NSS Employment Survey includes detailed 
questions about the daily activities for all persons over the age of four in surveyed households 
for the most recent seven days. We restrict the sample to persons aged 5 to 18 for child 
outcomes. We then compute for each child the percentage of days in the past seven days spent 
in each of schooling and child wage work respectively. Generally, the construction of outcome 
variables follow Imbert and Papp (2015), while gender dynamics and children responsive 
engagements in periods of labour shocks triggered by exogenous weather shocks in rural India 
are additional consideration in our setting.  
 
4.2 Summary Statistics  
 
The summary statistics for the main variables from the three rounds of the 
Employment/Unemployment datasets can be found on Table 1. Wet and dry shock components 
of quantified rainfall shock in the later part of the table show that there are more positive rainfall 
shock regimes across Indian districts than negative shocks within the three rainfall shock years 
engaged in this paper. Similarly, interaction terms of NREGS with positive and negative 
rainfall shocks demonstrate similar magnitudes as above.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Male Dummy 0.5101 0.4999 
Age 28.8036 18.7068 
Household Size 6.0067 2.8890 
Scheduled Caste Dummy 0.7329 0.4424 
Expenditure (’000 Rupees) 4.2981 3.3220 
Adult categories   
        Married Dummy 0.8387 0.3678 
        No Formal Education 0.4214 0.4938 
        Primary 0.2543 0.4354 
        Lower Secondary 0.1217 0.3270 
        Higher Secondary 0.1070 0.3091 
        College and above 0.0957 0.2941 
Engagement Ratios   
        Labour Engagement Ratio 6.7270 1.3536 
        Labour Engagement Ratio (Children) 0.9546 2.3702 
        School Engagement Ratio (Children) 5.3527 2.9581 
Shocks   
       Wet Shock 0.4185 0.7539 
       Dry Shock 0.3573 0.4870 
       Wet Shock(Interaction) 0.2345 0.6255 
       Dry Shock (Interaction) 0.1977 0.4027 
Notes: Table 1 above reports summary statistics for 946,862 individuals and 316,222 children 
respectively. Adult categories for married dummy and education status in the above table report the 
summary statistics for adults above 25 years of age. Wet Shock is measured as actual values of 
deviations for positive log deviation from mean rainfall values while Dry Shock is the absolute 
values of negative log-deviation measures.   
 
The identification strategy for the impact NREGS on child schooling and labour outcomes 
relies on changes at the district level. The NREGS is implemented in phases at the district level 
within states. We follow Imbert and Paap (2015) to drop districts that are completely urban and 
use only data for persons located in rural areas because the workfare program is applicable only 
to persons living in rural areas. We are able to match rainfall data to individual engagements 
in the past 7 days for 568 districts of the 594 baseline districts in 2004-05 employment-
unemployment data (representing 95.6 percent). We follow Impert and Paap (2015) by using 
data for July 2004 to June 2005 to form the pre-program period while data spanning July 2007 
to June 2008 are attributed the post-program period. In a more comprehensive dimension that 
ensures complete implementation of the NREGS program across all Indian districts, we 
complement the empirical analysis of this paper with data from July 2009 to June 2010 to 
document response in outcomes to rainfall shock after the program had been introduced in the 
entire country. 
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5. Empirical Strategy  
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the responsive change in adult labour, child 
labour and children schooling choices associated with the implementation of NREGS policy 
associated with shocks while controlling for a host of time and geographic fixed effects and 
linear trends. To implement this objective, we merged the district level precipitation data for 
India with employment-unemployment data to calculate associated district level exogenous 
shocks facing each community and examine the effect of NREGS.  Because we have 
information on individual engagements in early NREGS districts after they received NREGS 
only, we are able to control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics affecting labour 
choices that are associated with the implementation of NREGS. The NREGS implementation 
was staggered across the Indian districts in three phases, so we adopted a standard DID 
methodology where we interact a dummy for NREGS implementation9 across districts with the 
exogenous rainfall shock attributed to the districts prior to public works season. We also 
include district fixed effects to control for additional time-invariant spatial heterogeneity.  
 
Yidt = 𝛽1 Wet Shockdt−1 + 𝛽2(Wet Shockdt−1 ×  NREGSdt) +
𝛽3 Dry Shockdt−1 + 𝛽4(Dry Shockdt−1 × NREGSdt)  + 𝑋𝑖𝑑𝑡
′ Г + 𝜂𝑑 + µ𝑡 +
𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡                (4)  
 
where Yidt denotes the labour and schooling outcomes for individual respondent i residing in 
district d in year t, NREGSdt is an indicator variable equal to one if a district is categorised as  
belonging to early NREGS districts and zero otherwise. Wet Shockdt−1 measures quantified 
rainfall attributed to positive rainfall shock in a district for the past planting season while 
Dry Shockdt−1 measures quantified rainfall loss attributed to negative rainfall shock in a 
district for the past planting season. Wet Shockdt−1 × NREGSdt is the interactive term 
between district level positive rainfall shock and NREGS dummy while  Dry Shockdt−1 ×
 NREGSdt  is the interactive term between district level negative rainfall shock and NREGS 
dummy. Wet Shock and Dry Shock components of eq. (4) disintegrate the role of favourable 
and unfavourable agricultural season on average labour engagements at the district level and 
their interaction terms show the effect of the workfare policy on these outcomes. Xidt is a vector 
of individual and household level demographic controls (where individual controls are gender, 
age, marital status and education categories for individual respondents while household 
controls include household head gender, household size, number of children below age 5, 
indicator for household caste. 𝜂𝑑 are district fixed effects and µ𝑡 are year fixed effect. 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡 is 
the individual error term. Errors are clustered at the district level to address the issue of spatial 
correlation between rainfall shock and outcome variables in eq.(4) above. As documented in 
Cameron et al. (2008), a panel of 568 districts in the employment-unemployment data after 
mergers with UDEL rainfall data indicates satisfies standard asymptotic tests.  
 
We estimate the parameters of eq. (4) for non-agricultural labour market outcomes from 
a shock specification designated to equations (2) and (3). As in a standard DID methodology, 
we interpret 𝛽1 as the causal effect of positive shock on average labour market engagements 
within the district and 𝛽2 as the causal effect of NREGS on average labour market engagements 
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within a district during for positive shocks. 𝛽3 represents the causal effect of negative shock on 
average labour market engagements within the district while 𝛽4  measures the causal role of 
NREGS in this regard. 
 
There exist at least one potential threat to identifying the causal effect of NREGS policy 
on welfare outcomes in section 5. It is understandable from the implementation of the program 
that the early implementations focused on poorer districts in order to ameliorate poverty trends 
in such locations quickly. In alignment with our concern stated above, different patterns in 
child schooling and labour choices between districts by poverty level may already exist and 
this could bias our results unless addressed. To address this concern, we applied two 
approaches: First, early NREGS districts may have fundamentally comparable background 
characteristics with those who received NREGS later. This would satisfy the quasi-random 
assignment of districts to early and late NREGS districts. This would enhance the interpretation 
of our results as causal since random assignment of treatment is an important econometric 
requirement for causal interpretation of estimates from intervention programs. Second, we 
performed a placebo test using the 1999-2000 NSS wave and focussing on the same outcome 
variables. In this strategy, we superimpose early and late exposure to NREGS to relevant 
districts for the 1999-2000 wave to check if shock and interaction estimates will show any 
unique pattern. The results from this regression are discussed later in this paper.  
 
 
6. Results 
6.1     General Labour Outcomes 
Our regressions focus on informal labour market variables and schooling activities of 
individual respondents in the past seven days. However, we restrict our sample for the 
schooling engagements to children between 5 and 18 years of age to capture human capital 
accumulation impacts of the different categories of shocks and corresponding NREGS impacts. 
Table 2 presents estimates of different components of rainfall shocks and their respective 
interaction terms with NREGS for labour market engagements in the past seven days. Columns 
1 and 2 of Table 2 report estimates with and without controls respectively. Whilst estimates are 
not exactly the same across these two columns, they are not significantly different.  
We now focus on Table 2 Column 2, where we execute our estimation with controls. 
The results show that a one-standard deviation positive rainfall shock decreases the ratio of 
labour market engagement of an average individual in the village by 0.6 percentage points (not 
significant at traditional levels). The interaction term of positive shock and NREGS presents 
an estimate of 0.02 representing a 2.0 percentage point increase in labour market engagements 
for NREGS exposed communities. Combined together, these results can be interpreted as 
meaning that there is an insignificant impact of positive rainfall shock on labour market 
activities of villages yet to be exposed to NREGS while there is an overall 1.4 percentage point 
increase for exposed villages. However, negative rainfall shock estimate and its interaction 
term significantly evens out when compared to each other. Specifically, the negative rainfall 
shock estimate indicates that a one-standard deviation negative rainfall shock decreases the 
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ratio of labour market engagement of an average individual in the village by 4.2 percentage 
points  while its interaction term lessens the deleterious effect of negative rainfall shock by an 
increase in labour market engagement of 6.0 percentage points. Coefficient estimates of dry 
shock and its interaction with NREGS are both at 1 percent level.  
 
Table 2: The Impact of Wet Shock and Dry Shock (and Interaction with NREGS) on 
Rural Labour Engagement in India (2004 - 2011).  
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of Days Worked Per Week  
Variables (1) (2) 
Wet shock  -0.0165 -0.0058 
 (0.0104) (0.0099) 
NREGS * Wet shock  0.0280 0.0238 
 (0.0185) (0.0147) 
Dry shock      -0.0365*** -0.0420*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0100) 
NREGS * Dry shock        0.0582*** 0.0604*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0165) 
Constant       6.9994*** 6.9332*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0347) 
   
District Fixed Effect YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES 
Controls NO YES 
Observations 946,574  946,574  
R-squared 0.0650                     0.2068 
Notes: Table 2 above presents estimates of wet shock and dry shock along with estimates of their 
corresponding interactive terms with National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy. 
Results reported capture rural communities in 568 Indian districts. Controls used in Column 2 include 
gender, age, marital status and education categories for individual respondents while household controls 
include household head gender, household size, number of children below age 5, number of adults in paid 
wage employment, caste group and expenditure of the household in the previous twelve months. Labour 
force fraction of the district sample is included as an additional district level control. All regressions are 
clustered at the district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1%  
 
Table 3 presents the estimates for the labour engagement variable by gender. Column 
2 for Panel A for male observations indicate that positive rainfall shock and its interaction do 
not have any meaningful effect on male’s labour market engagements in rural India. On the 
other way round, the negative rainfall shock and interaction term shows estimates significant 
at 1 percent for both. This indicates that there is an important role for negative rainfall shock 
on male’s labour dynamics with an attendant intervention of NREGS to cushion such shocks. 
The negative  rainfall shock estimate  indicates that a one-standard deviation negative rainfall 
shock decreases the ratio of labour market engagement of a male in the village by 5.0 
percentage points while its interaction term matches the deleterious effect of negative rainfall 
shock by an increase in labour market engagement of 6.0 percentage points for males. 
12 
 
However, for estimates presented in Table 3 Panel B (for female observations), results show 
that that a one-standard deviation positive rainfall shock decreases the ratio of labour market 
engagement of an average female in the village by 0.3 percentage points (not significant at 
traditional level). The interaction term between positive rainfall shock and NREGS reports an 
estimate of 0.03 which indicates a 3.0 percentage points increase in labour market engagement 
of females for early exposure communities. For the negative rainfall shock counterpart, the 
negative rainfall shock estimate indicates that a one-standard deviation negative rainfall shock 
decreases the ratio of labour market engagement of females in the village by 4.0 percentage 
points. This estimate is counteracted by an interaction term estimate of 7.0 percentage points. 
Both estimates are significant at 1 percent level.    
Table 3: The Impact of Wet Shock and Dry Shock (and Interaction with NREGS) on Rural Labour 
Engagement in India by Gender (2004 - 2011). 
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of Days Worked Per Week  
 Panel A: Males  Panel B: Females 
Variables (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Wet shock      -0.0168        -0.0082        -0.0168* -0.0029 
 (0.0130) (0.0131)  (0.0093)   (0.0085) 
NREGS * Wet shock  0.0186        0.0179     0.0381**     0.0295** 
  (0.0215) (0.0184)  (0.0173)    (0.0134) 
Dry shock       -0.0439***     -0.0492***     -0.0290**       -0.0359*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0124)   (0.0115)     (0.0110) 
NREGS * Dry shock       0.0505**      0.0553***        0.0664***         0.0660*** 
   (0.0204) (0.0191)    (0.0199)      (0.0181) 
Constant       7.0054***      6.9177***        6.9932***         6.9014*** 
    (0.0080) (0.0417)      (0.0071)       (0.0418) 
      
District Fixed Effect YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES  YES YES 
Controls  NO YES  NO YES 
Observations 482,827 482,827  463,747 463,747 
R-squared 0.0681 0.2133  0.0633 0.2084 
Notes: Table 3 above presents estimates of wet shock and dry shock along with estimates of their corresponding interactive terms 
with National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy for male and female respondents respectively. Results 
reported capture rural communities in 568 Indian districts. See Table 2 for a list of controls. All regressions are clustered at the 
district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1% 
 
The results for overall labour engagement in Table 2 above re-establishes the 
interventionist role of NREGS in generating more informal labour opportunities during shocks 
that threaten livelihood in the rural areas. This is also the case for both male and female labour 
market opportunities in NREGS villages. However, it is important to note an oversaturated 
labour market dynamics for rural dwellers living in the NREGS communities in periods of 
positive shocks. While this pattern is not particularly revealed for all observations and male 
observations, it appears for the female counterparts (Table 3 Panel B). The favourable 
economic trajectory provided by positive rainfall shocks provides more room for expansion 
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when combined with NREGS projects within a village. Hence, the usual informal employees 
may be overwhelmed by the new opportunities creating a unique platform for females to 
engage in non-agricultural labour activities within the informal sector.  
 
6.2 Child Schooling and Labour 
Following our findings with the overall labour market outcome during shocks and the 
differential role of NREGS in the disaggregated shock specification, we now investigate human 
capital dimension of the impact of wet shock and dry shock and the role of NREGS. Table 4 
presents shocks and interaction terms estimates for schooling engagements of children between 
the age of 5 and 18 years. The focus on this age range is informed by possible labour supply 
substitution effects that diverse shocks may prompt in rural communities where children are 
susceptible to child labour.  
Table 4 Column 2 reports significant estimates for wet shock and its interaction with 
the NREGS indicator. These estimates are respectively 0.07 and -0.13 (significant at 5 and 1 
percent levels). Interpreting the estimates implies that a one-standard deviation positive shock 
increases average school engagements of children by 7 percentage points while there is 13 
percentage points decrease for children resident in early exposed villages. This means that 
positive shocks enable children in non-NREGS villages to increase their schooling 
engagements by 7 percentage points while this effect is reversed for NREGS villages. 
Combining the positive shock effect and its interaction term yields an overall negative impact 
for early exposed villages with a decrease of schooling participation of approximately 6 
percentage points - The increase of 7 percentage points is counteracted by the negative 13 
percentage points of the interaction term. While it is expected to have human capital 
accumulation for villages with prosperous economic outlook, the deleterious impacts for 
villages exposed to NREGS is unanticipated and indeed contradicts the overall objective of the 
policy.  Estimates of dry shock and its interaction term are smaller and insignificant at 
traditional levels. This indicates that dry shock have no apparent effect on children’s schooling 
engagements neither does  NREGS play any important role on children’s schooling 
engagements during periods of dry shocks. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Wet Shock and Dry Shock and Interaction with NREGS on Children’s 
School Engagements in Rural India (2004 - 2011).  
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of Days in School Per Week 
Variables (1) (2) 
Wet shock    0.0856**    0.0708** 
        (0.0366) (0.0339) 
NREGS * Wet shock    -0.1711***     -0.1261*** 
 (0.0476) (0.0477) 
Dry shock           0.0423 0.0444 
 (0.0446) (0.0381) 
NREGS * Dry shock         -0.1161*                         -0.0793 
 (0.0626) (0.0573) 
Constant     5.2128***      2.7251*** 
 (0.0236) (0.2023) 
   
District Fixed Effect  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES 
Controls  NO YES 
Observations 316,138 316,138 
R-squared 0.0511 0.2731 
Notes: Table 4 above presents estimates of wet shock and dry shock along with estimates of their corresponding interactive 
terms with National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy for children aged 5 – 18 years. Results 
reported capture rural communities in 568 Indian districts. See Table 2 for a list of controls. All regressions are clustered 
at the district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1%  
   
Table 5 presents estimates of the schooling engagements of children by age categories. 
As expected wet shock and interactive term estimates for children between 5 and 9 years of 
age are inconsequential and insignificant at conventional levels. On the other way round, the 
estimates for the 10 – 14 years category have magnitudes comparable to those unveiled for the 
overall children regression in Table 4 Column 2 but the interaction term is not significant at 
traditional levels.  However, the most important finding from this disintegration estimation is 
the heterogeneous results as showcased from column 3 where wet shock and interaction term 
estimates are larger compared to baseline schooling estimates and significant at 1 percent level. 
Interpretation of estimates in column 2 for children between 10 – 14 years of age reflect exactly 
the same pattern in the overall school engagement outcome. Interpreting the estimates for the 
eldest category of children indicate that a one-standard deviation positive shock increases 
average school engagements of 15 – 18 years children in our sample by 18 percentage points 
while there is a decrease of 20 percentage points for this category of children who are resident 
in early exposed villages. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Wet Shock and Dry Shock (and Interaction with NREGS) on Children’s School 
Engagements in Rural India by Age Group (2004 - 2011). 
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of Days in School Per Week 
 Panel A: 0 – 9 years  Panel B: 10 – 14 years  Panel C:15 – 18 years 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3) 
Wet shock  -0.0115    0.0578*      0.1839*** 
 (0.0475)   (0.0351)              (0.0508) 
NREGS * Wet shock            -0.0807              -0.0866    -0.1977*** 
 (0.0692)  (0.0530)              (0.0663) 
Dry shock             0.0490               0.0239     0.1295** 
 (0.0485)  (0.0413)  (0.0644) 
NREGS * Dry shock            -0.1146  -0.1264**  -0.0305 
 (0.0803)              (0.0607)  (0.0991) 
Constant     -2.1066***     5.7784***      8.3070*** 
 (0.2853)  (0.2091)  (0.3418) 
      
District Fixed Effect  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed Effect  YES  YES  YES 
Controls  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 112,703  115,784  87,651 
R-squared 0.2719  0.2314  0.4102 
Notes: Table 5 above presents estimates of wet shock and dry shock along with estimates of their corresponding interactive 
terms with National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy for children by their age groups respectively 
highlighted in Columns 1 – 3 above. Results reported capture rural communities in 568 Indian districts. See Table 2 for a list 
of controls. All regressions are clustered at the district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1%  
 
The heterogeneous pattern in the impact of wet shocks and the resultant role of NREGS 
is intuitive given the background that the eldest category of children are prone to partake in 
labour market activities in exchange for money where there is reportedly a shortage of labour 
supply due to abounding opportunities. While similar estimates may be plausible for the 
category of children between 10 – 14 years of age due to their capacity to engage in wage work, 
it is unexpected for those in youngest category – 5 to 9 years of age.  However, the 
heterogeneous effect of shocks and interactive terms with NREGS by gender of children which 
is reported on Table A1 does not reveal any significant heterogeneous pattern.  Indeed, the wet 
shock and its interaction term estimates are very closely related to estimates revealed in the 
overall regression reported on Table 4 above.  
Table 6 presents estimates of diverse shocks and their corresponding interaction terms 
with NREGS for child labour engagements in the past 7 days. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that 
wet shock in the previous agricultural season causes children to reduce their engagement in 
labour market activities while the presence of NREGS program will counteract this effect. The 
estimates are significant at 1 percent level. Estimates for dry shock and corresponding 
interaction term are similar in magnitude but insignificant at traditional levels. Whilst we lose 
precision for the interaction term of wet shock when controls are introduced into our estimation 
in column 2, it does not necessarily overrule the pattern revealed in column 1.  The findings 
16 
 
from Table 6, as expected, corroborates the schooling engagement patterns of children 
especially as it relates to the implementation of NREGS policy during positive shocks. Rather 
than founding our schooling engagement outcomes on general labour markets alone, results 
from Table 6 reveal a unique child labour market behaviour associated with wet shocks in a 
way that is consistent, on one hand, with general labour market and, on the other hand with 
children schooling engagements.  
Table 6: The Impact of Wet Shock and Dry Shock (and Interaction with NREGS) on 
Children’s Labour Market Engagements in Rural India (2004 - 2011).  
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of Days in Child 
Labour Per Week 
Variables (1) (2) 
Wet shock       -0.0746***     -0.0607*** 
  (0.0225) (0.0206) 
NREGS * Wet shock        0.0776*** 0.0411 
  (0.0275)  (0.0262) 
Dry shock  -0.0558 -0.0586* 
   (0.0343)  (0.0311) 
NREGS * Dry shock    0.0695  0.0429 
    (0.0446)  (0.0420) 
Constant        1.0189***    -0.2422** 
    (0.0146)   (0.1117) 
   
District Fixed Effect    YES  YES 
Year Fixed Effect   YES  YES 
Controls    NO  YES 
Observations  316,138 316,138 
R-squared    0.0279 0.3606 
Notes: Table 6 above presents estimates of wet shock and dry shock along with estimates of their 
corresponding interactive terms with National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy 
for children aged 5 – 18 years. Results reported capture rural communities in 568 Indian districts. See 
Table 2 for a list of controls. All regressions are clustered at the district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1%  
 
7. Discussion   
Our major finding in relation to child labour and schooling outcomes in rural India is that public 
works policies play some crucial roles in agricultural dependent communities. However, 
NREGS reveals asymmetry pattern in the intermediation of public works policies for the 
components of rainfall shock in rural India. These results are logical with an explanation that 
each of wet shock and dry shock expose rural communities to different dynamic economic 
forces respectively. Wet shocks depict a substantially thriving agricultural sector where 
informal labour would be gainfully employed aftermath of the harvesting season. Informal 
employment opportunities in agricultural dependent areas usually focus on men within the 
labour force age bracket.  Women who are not engaged in non-agricultural activities and 
children are the usual categories of individuals to cover for the shortage of labour supply in 
17 
 
periods of labour shortage in informal markets of the developing economies. Engagement of 
school-age children in the labour market may distort school enrolments and performance of 
children due to distractions encountered from undue labour opportunities for the children. 
While this setting reflects the common features in rural areas of most developing countries, the 
resultant role of public works during shock periods cannot be generalised10. To perform a 
placebo test, we assigned relevant communities to NREGS program before commencement of 
the workfare policy using 1999 – 2000 wave of the NSS data and rainfall from UDEL. 
Estimates from the regression show that our main results (See Table A2) are not replicated for 
the placebo implementation of staggered NREGS implementation contrary to the actual 
implementation of this program. This result reinforces the fact that our results on Tables 2 – 6 
are not coincidence. Table A3 also shows that most of the background characteristics are not 
different across the early and late NREGS districts.    
Although maternal labour supply have yielded positive outcomes for children’s human 
capital tendencies, the literature on the impact of NREGS on child labour and schooling 
outcomes have revealed mixed findings depending on the type of data and identification 
method adopted. The positive impact of adult labour opportunities is indeed consistent with the 
underlying initiatives of public works policies (Afridi et al. 2012) and for other labour market 
variations in favour of women (Marchand et al. 2013). Furthermore, the literature on the impact 
of public works programs on children schooling and labour outcomes reveal contrasting 
findings using India and Argentina as case studies (Islam and Sivasankaran 2014; Juras 2014). 
In another context, Shah and Steinberg (2015) reveal that each year of exposure to NREGS 
decreases school enrolment by 2 percentage points and math scores by 2% of a standard 
deviation amongst children aged 13-16. The pathway established for this negative impact of 
NREGS on child labour is the attendant increase in the opportunity cost of schooling which 
subsequently lowers human capital investment for additional years of exposure to NREGS.   
Our findings extends the above literature by integrating female and child labour 
engagements alongside children school engagements within a disaggregated shock model. 
While each of the above outcomes have been investigated in the diverse contexts in the 
literature, our contribution exploits on simultaneously investigating labour and human capital 
accumulation outcomes in India11. We focus on the responsive role of NREGS for each of the 
disaggregated shock on diverse outcomes as against directly investigating the impact of 
NREGS on these variables.  Interestingly, we find that while NREGS helps smoothing labour 
in dry shocks, excessive informal labour engagement appears to be the major consequence of 
successful agricultural season. While on one part, we find that this helps to integrate women in 
the wage labour subsector of the informal sector as against unpaid agricultural and domestic 
labour, we equally find that this hurts schooling engagements of children within the 
communities. These findings are consistent with similar literature which used phase roll-out of 
NREGS in India to investigate children human capital outcomes (Islam and Sivasankaran 2014; 
Shah and Steinberg 2015). Furthermore, our setting provides a unique framework for 
considering the efficacy of NREGS in combating poverty dynamics in rural economies without 
compromising human capital accumulation of children. 
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8. Conclusion    
Public works policies are established in the developing countries to help curb poverty 
propensities of vulnerable households. These policies most times also play an insurance role to 
cushion shocks from rural economic activities. Given that the implementation of the public 
works program is effected through the provision of alternative labour market opportunities for 
rural households whose livelihood depends on rainfed agricultural practices, not incorporating 
community-specific shock dynamics of rural communities may lead to unintended welfare 
consequences of workfare policy per time. This paper incorporates two important shock 
components of rainfall pattern into the implementation of NREGS in rural India to investigate 
resultant labour market outcomes and children outcomes respectively. We use the phase roll-
out of NREGS in Indian villages in addition to exogenous variation in rainfall shocks across 
Indian districts in a DID framework to identify the impact of NREGS on wet shock and dry 
shock respectively. This approach differentiates our study from existing literature on the impact 
of public works policies in general. Our main focus is basically on the impact of each of the 
shocks on labour market and children schooling outcomes while NREGS is incorporated to 
visualise the resulting intervention role or otherwise of the policy.  
Our results show that NREGS helps mitigate the deleterious impact of negative rainfall 
shocks in rural Indian districts. In this regard, our baseline estimates indicate that while one 
standard deviation negative rainfall shock decreases the labour market engagements by 4 
percentage points for communities not exposed to NREGS, this effect is counteracted by an 
estimate of 6 percentage points for communities exposed to NREGS.  On the other hand, there 
is no prevalent effect of wet shock and its interaction term on labour market engagements of 
individuals. Further results show that the expansion in informal labour engagements during wet 
shocks is particularly driven by integration of females and children. While these findings are 
not in themselves deleterious, what becomes worrisome is the pervasive impact they have on 
schooling engagements of children especially between the age groups of 10 – 18 years.   
This paper contributes to the literature on the suitability of public work policies in 
sustaining welfare indicators for rural households. In a different perspective, climate change is 
commonly viewed as a change in the weather parameter in either direction - increase or 
decrease. The asymmetric pattern revealed in our findings is an important pointer to approaches 
required to resolve welfare distortion resulting from climate change.   
1 Some of the literature aimed at investigating the impact of previous versions of rural employment guarantee 
schemes in Indian states include Gaiha (1997); which investigates the role of rural public works program on long-
term wage formation in the agricultural sector of Maharashtra, Gaiha and Imai (2002); which investigates the 
poverty implication of Maharashtra’s employment guarantee scheme, and Jha et al. (2011); which compares the 
relative effectiveness of public works and food for work programmes on household welfare in Maharashtra. 
2 It is perceived that its staged rollout across districts and final nationwide coverage of NREGS makes it uniquely 
attractive for welfare investigations. 
3 The NREGS offers 100 days of guaranteed work to adults from rural households with the intention to help 
households to smooth consumption during lean agricultural seasons. 
4 The MGNREGA reserves one-third of the public works opportunities for rural women. This is the first ever 
move aimed at ensuring gender equity in a public works program in India. 
5 The literature recommends at least 30 years weather variation to capture potential deviation and recovery of 
weather parameters.  
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6 While district-referenced categorical rainfall shock measures adopted in Jayachandran (2006), Adhvaryu et al. 
(2013), Kaur (2014) and Chaurey (2015) are plausible shock measures, deviation from the historical average fits 
the current analytical framework more accurately. The linear rainfall shock is constructed using the following 
equation: Rainshockdt−1 = 𝑙𝑛 Rainfalldt−1 − 𝑙𝑛 Rainfalld̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   (1) 
7 Wet shock is measured as actual value if there is positive rainfall deviation from the historical norm and 0 
otherwise. Dry shock is measured as absolute value of deviation if negative deviation exists between rainfall 
deviation from the historical norm and 0 otherwise.  
8 While it is common knowledge that extreme weather conditions in drought and flood respectively malign 
agricultural yields, our categorised rainfall shock definitions follow from the basic logic that higher (lower) 
rainfall is associated with higher (lower) crop yields as is clearly elucidated in Chaurey (2015) and Kaur (2014) 
for India. 
9 We construct the indicator NREGS variable to focus on response in outcomes by early versus late NREGS 
communities where early adopters are the initial 200 communities where the NREGS is first implemented in 2005. 
Communities that fall within first implementation coverage are classified as 1 while others are classified as 0 for 
the NREGS indicator. 
10 There is a need to consider the underlying elements of the implementation of particular public work program 
and the role of institution for suitability and survival of a public work program for each setting for an effective 
welfare delivery. 
11 One major advantage of using the approach that considers a variety of outcomes in our paper is that it paints a 
comprehensive welfare picture that complements one another. This approach is required to make holistic 
conclusion of welfare role of NREGS after shocks. 
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Appendix  
 
 
Table A1: The Impact of Wet Shock and Dry Shock (and 
Interaction with NREGS) on Children’s School Engagements in 
Rural India by Gender (2004 - 2011).  
 Dependent Variable: Ratio of Days in 
School Per Week 
 Boys  Girls 
Variables (1)  (2) 
Wet shock  0.0551  0.0870** 
 (0.0382)  (0.0379) 
NREGS * Wet shock  -0.1179**  -0.1357** 
 (0.0503)  (0.0564) 
Dry shock  0.0240  0.0647 
 (0.0433)  (0.0473) 
NREGS * Dry shock  -0.0446  -0.1188* 
 (0.0623)  (0.0675) 
Constant 3.2868***  2.2828*** 
 (0.2184)  (0.2374) 
    
District Fixed Effect    YES  YES 
Year Fixed Effect  YES  YES 
Controls  YES  YES  
Observations 169,233  146,905 
R-squared 0.2387  0.3088 
Notes: Table A1 above presents estimates of wet shock and dry shock along with 
estimates of their corresponding interactive terms with National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy for children by gender. 
Results reported capture rural communities in 568 Indian districts. See Table 2 
for a list of controls. All regressions are clustered at the district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1% 
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Table A2: Placebo Test for the Impact of Rainfall Shocks and 
NREGS on Adult Labour, Children’s Schooling and Labour 
Outcomes in Rural India (1999 - 2000). 
 Dependent variables: 
 Labour School Child-labour 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Wet shock 0.0001 -0.1454 -0.0507 
 (0.0008)  (0.1370) (0.0858) 
NREGS * Wet shock  0.0006  0.2721* 0.0452 
 (0.0010)   (0.1499) (0.0861) 
Dry shock  0.0001 -0.0632 -0.0361  
 (0.0005)  (0.1026) (0.0734) 
NREGS * Dry shock  0.0010** -0.0800 -0.0249 
 (0.0005)   (0.1535) (0.0796) 
Constant     6.9999***     7.7120*** -2.7653*** 
 (0.0010)   (0.1683) (0.0774) 
    
Controls  YES YES YES  
Observations 143,903 51,982 51,982 
R-squared 0.0006 0.1720 0.3545 
Notes: Table A2 above presents Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates of wet shock 
and dry shock along with estimates of their corresponding interactive terms with 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) dummy on general labour 
market, schooling and child labour outcomes respectively. This table focus on a 
placebo test which allocates Indian districts to NREGS policy before 
commencement of the implementation. Results reported capture rural communities 
in 226 Indian districts. Each column report result with the full set of controls. See 
Table 2 for a list of controls. All regressions are clustered at the district level.    
* indicates significant at 10%  
** indicates significant at 5%   
*** indicates significant at 1%  
 
 
Assignment of Indian Districts to NREGS 
While rainfall shock is exogenous, concerns regarding non-random assignment of NREGS may 
affect the causal interpretation of our estimates. The background section presents that NREGS 
phase roll-out takes poverty level of the rural communities into consideration in the initial 
implementation of the program. This implementation strategy may lead to a bias in the 
treatment effect. More elaborately, the approach essentially violates random assignment in a 
manner that may lead to our treatment effect being driven by other factors other than the 
availability of job opportunities relative to other rural communities in the country. To 
investigate if the sample divisions between early and late implementation communities 
represent some form of quasi-random sampling framework, we compare the baseline 
characteristics of the concerned communities at the individual, household and community 
levels respectively. These include demographic characteristics and wealth indices of early and 
late NREGS communities.  Results on Table A3 reports differential test statistics of 
aforementioned attributes by time of implementation to see if these samples are comparable in 
any way. As revealed in Table A3 Column 5, there is no significant difference in the baseline 
characteristics of the early exposed communities to late exposed communities. This indicates 
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that while treatment may not have been randomly assigned across Indian districts, they 
systematically have similar features and can be explored in terms of this quasi-random quality 
with respect to assignment to either early or late NREGS community.  
 
 
Table A3: Individual, Household and District Level Characteristics (2004 – 2010) 
  Early Treatment Late Treatment  Norm-Difference 
Variable         Mean SD    Mean   SD  
Sex 0.5106 0.4999 0.5093 0.4999 0.0019 
Age 28.3287 18.5100 29.4908 18.9671 -0.0439 
Household size 5.9798 2.8885 6.0456 2.8894 -0.0161 
Caste 0.7611 0.4264 0.6921 0.4616 0.1097 
Consumption expenditure ('000 Rupees) 0.3900 0.2883 0.4874 0.3797 -0.2045 
No of children 0.7543 1.0317 0.7011 1.0136 0.0367 
No of adults in wage labour 0.5549 0.9213 0.6299 0.9628 -0.0564 
Value of land (ln) 5.3946 2.3311 5.3463 2.3987 0.0144 
District Labour force ratio 0.5725 0.0573 0.5833 0.0540 -0.1377 
Adults       
Married 0.8568 0.3503 0.8419 0.3649 0.0132 
No formal education  0.5454 0.4979 0.4655 0.4988 0.1133 
Primary 0.2458 0.4306 0.2769 0.4475 -0.0501 
Lower Secondary 0.0971 0.2960 0.1177 0.3222 -0.0471 
Higher Secondary 0.0689 0.2532 0.0877 0.2828 -0.0495 
College&above 0.0428 0.2025 0.0522 0.2224 -0.0310  
Notes: Information on household land asset worth is only available in the 2004-2005 and 2010-2011 waves respectively. The p-value is 
reported from a test on the equality of the mean between the treatment and control groups (independent samples). As the sample size is 
sufficiently large the results for using a classical t-test deliver very similar results. Since the group size between the groups differ, approximate 
t using individual sample variances instead of the pooled variance and Welch's approximation of the degrees of freedom have been used. The 
normalized difference is computed as norm−difference = 
𝑋1− 𝑋2
√𝑆1
2+ 𝑆2
2
.   
 
